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Linking Mine Action and 
Development: Local-level 
Benefits and Challenges
In many post-conflict regions, landmines and explosive remnants of war1 remain, limiting 
recovery and development even after mine-clearance projects are completed. A number of 
mine-clearance organizations are starting to promote “linking mine action and development” 
as a better alternative to a separate and uncoordinated approach. 
by Russell Gasser [ Humanitarian Technology Consulting Ltd. ] 
There are few things more discouraging than land that has been painstakingly demined only to remain unused following clearance. Cleared land that goes unused because use of that 
land is not a development priority is a waste of money and effort. In 
addition, the risk of deminer injury or death for no obvious benefit is 
frustrating and demoralizing. 
If land that is considered a high priority for community or eco-
nomic development can also be prioritized for clearance, there can 
be some valuable results and the benefits can multiply. Linking mine 
action and development not only helps to eliminate wasted demining 
but also has the ability to optimize the impact of mine action in several 
other ways. However, linking mine action with development has some 
serious consequences for the way that mine clearance undertakes both 
prioritization and clearance at a local level.
Broad interest in linking mine action and development has led to a 
“contact group,” consisting primarily of representatives attending the 
States Parties meetings for the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention.2 
The group also includes other invited partners and is coordinated 
through the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining. 
In June 2008, the GICHD published extensive draft guidelines for link-
ing MA and development for development partners, mine-affected 
states, official development agencies and mine-action organizations.3
What Does “Linking MA and Development” Really Mean?
One current definition of this approach states that linking mine 
action and development simply means that mine action is aligned with 
broader development priorities and programs at all levels. This defini-
tion is based on the recognition that landmines and explosive remnants 
of war constrain post-conflict reconstruction and development.4 Linking 
the two is not a single option, however, nor is it a simple yes or no deci-
sion. There is an entire spectrum of possible relationships between mine 
action and development, with no one correct approach suitable for all 
situations. Here are some of the possibilities:
No relationship, no linkage. In this case, mine action and develop-
ment work independently, with separate goals, and separate prioritiza-
tion and project-selection mechanisms. Development agencies adhering 
to this approach are likely to regard mine-contaminated areas as inac-
cessible, deciding not to plan development projects in these areas. 
Leader-follower relationship. Usually, development staff wait for de-
mining to be completed before starting development projects. Sometimes, 
mine action waits until development funding is available before start-
ing mine-action work. Initial planning of development work in areas 
intended to be cleared may be undertaken, but there is a likely delay 
between the end of demining and the start of development activities. 
Development priorities in this case may not be able to make  the best use 
of completed mine clearance. 
Coordination. In this option, mine action and development are 
informed of each other’s priorities, and work together as far as pos-
sible without a major change in approach to either. Coordination can 
lead to much shorter delays in take-up of cleared land, but it does not 
significantly change the prioritization of mine action to take develop-
ment needs into full account. For example, the actions most needed to 
address the causes of poverty in a region may not be those indicated by 
the Landmine Impact Survey data used to decide demining priorities.
Support and promote. Using this approach, mine action supports 
development by giving priority to work in areas where development 
projects are to be funded. These areas may be given higher priority within 
an existing priority mechanism, for example, by considering overall 
socioeconomic and development impact beyond the Landmine Impact 
Survey data. Also, mine action may be started in these areas by working 
outside of, and therefore effectively ignoring, the established national 
or regional priority-setting mechanism. Mine-action organizations and 
structures may themselves promote development in areas that have 
been cleared or are about to be cleared. Mine action follows established 
technical approaches and generally works in the same way as usual, 
irrespective of the nature of the development activities. 
Integration. In this final possibility, mine action is fully 
integrated with development, as prioritization and imple-
mentation are based on the overall development impact and 
not the mine-action impact alone. A low-priority suspected 
hazardous area that is a severe blockage to development 
might be cleared ahead of medium- or high-priority SHAs, 
as defined by mine-action priorities. This approach goes a 
significant step further than the use of socioeconomic data 
in prioritization by using key development goals as the over-
riding criteria. Mine-action methods, especially demining 
methods, may need to be significantly altered to increase 
overall development impact. This approach to demining 
is likely to result in mine clearance that is more expensive 
and less efficient than optimized mine clearance. However, 
losing efficiency in the mine-action part of a project may 
allow for far greater gains in costs and efficiency in the 
overall development project. Full linkage of mine action 
and development requires that a large-scale development 
view be used in setting priorities and determining costs. 
Timing can be a key requirement for linkage between 
mine action and development. Selecting the tasks that are 
going to hold up the “critical path” for the overall devel-
opment activities as the highest priority is different from 
a national or local mine-action center setting priorities 
to clear as efficiently as possible. This may not be an easy 
or entirely comfortable shift in roles and responsibilities. 
Enabling this transition without causing mine-action spe-
cialists to feel that they have to play “second fiddle” to 
development planners while ensuring that they do not 
feel that this transition diluted the authority and lowered 
the standing of mine action, will require care. The closer 
the linkage, the more change may be necessary to mine- 
clearance prioritization and implementation. Without 
a clear understanding of what linking MA and development is about and an under-
standing of the potential benefits of this change, the loss of hard-won efficiency and 
impact is not likely to be welcomed by deminers.
Full linkage of demining and development demands a new paradigm for mine 
action at a local level, where clearance is seen as an enabling activity or a service in 
support of development, rather than a separate activity or a precursor to develop-
ment. When fully linked to development goals, mine action is a “team player,” with a 
specific role of ensuring that it makes the greatest possible contribution to reducing 
poverty by enabling development, a significant change from the role of maximizing 
the reduction of the humanitarian or socioeconomic impact of mines. 
Examples of Local Linkages 
Angola. Clearance and verification of roads are key in assisting the return of 
refugees and internally displaced persons to their villages. In some regions, roads that 
are mined, or believed to be mined, can rapidly become overgrown and impenetrable, 
so there is no way to find out what lies along the former route. In some areas there are 
rivers that need replacement of substantial bridges that are 5 meters (16 feet) long or 
more. Unless bridges are rebuilt, roads cannot be used by vehicles, and if they remain 
unused for several years while money and materials are found to build a bridge, then 
the vegetation will return and the roads will disappear again. Local memory of what 
is still a suspected area and what has been cleared can be fickle, and rumors that the 
mine-free road is not used because it is still not safe can start and spread. Linking 
mine clearance to civil works like bridge building has obvious benefits in cases 
like these.  
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following mine clearance of their house and land, 
a family returned to their small farm in a former heavily mined area. Life was not 
easy, but a living could be made. When the young daughter of the family reached 
school age, however, the family seriously considered moving back to the nearest 
town, as there was no affordable transport available to take her to and from school. 
Demining the village could have been in vain if the children did not have access to 
education. If the farmers left the area again, the funds invested in road repairs and 
support to agriculture, as well as demining, would be wasted and the local economy 
set back. Like many development problems, this issue was unexpected and required 
community involvement, acting with the municipal authorities, to find a solution 
based on a bus service. Mine-action prioritization alone cannot address or resolve 
problems like these.5
This bridge in Angola was demined but not repaired.
A farmer in Bosnia-Herzegovina returns to his land after it was cleared 
but finds there are still mines very close to the area.
ALL pHoTos CouRTesy of THe AuTHoR
1
Gasser: Linking Mine Action and Development: Local-level Benefits and Challenges
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2008
8 | editorial | the journal of ERW and mine action | winter 2008/09 | 12.2 12.2 | winter 2008/09 | the journal of ERW and mine action | editorial | 9
Southeast Europe. Finally, there is another 
case from Southeast Europe, where a large 
development agency was planning a substan-
tial project in support of rural reconstruction. 
The funding timetable was set and required 
tight coordination of the various aspects 
of the project if the ambitious goals were to 
be achieved. Should the whole project be 
delayed, risking a reduction of the impact, or 
even a total loss of financial support, to allow 
12 months and a lot of money for mine clear-
ance of affected areas? Or, should the mine- 
contaminated areas suffer “double jeopardy” 
by being excluded from the development 
funding in order to keep the rest of the project 
on track and on budget? 
Linking mine action and development 
may offer a potential solution that is outside 
the usual way of working and prioritizing of 
demining: gradual clearance, which aims to 
clear just enough land, just in time, to ensure 
that key intermediate development goals of 
the overall large project can be met. One part 
of the project, for example, building up a goat 
farm, was planned to take several years, but 
the necessary land was mined. Immediate de- 
mining of access routes and the key build-
ings was needed so that the infrastructure 
could be rehabilitated before the project 
started. Demining of the first part of the pas-
ture could, if necessary, wait a year. Clearing 
further buildings would take a little lon-
ger, but finally, as the herd of goats gradu-
ally increased, the rest of the pasture would 
be cleared. This all makes for slow, inefficient 
and hence relatively expensive demining, but 
the overall gains in development activities 
could be considerable. In this approach, pri-
oritization and task planning for mine clear-
ance would be dominated by the development 
project and its time frame and not by demin-
ing or LIS criteria. 
Conclusion
Many approaches exist concerning demin-
ing and its connection to development within 
affected communities. Clearance projects can 
be successfully completed, but afterward the 
cleared land remains unused, as no develop-
ment program exists to assist the community 
in rebuilding what was lost through war and 
violence. Linking MA and development helps 
to ensure that clearance projects in mined 
communities are not in vain by approaching 
the process in a new, more integrated way. 
See Endnotes, page 110
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A t the first meeting of the cluster-ban process in Oslo, Norway, in February 2007, there were four African countries present: Angola, Egypt, Mozambique and South Africa.  Only three 
states, however, signed the Oslo Declaration at the end of the confer-
ence: Angola, Mozambique and South Africa. A little over a year ago, at 
the Lima Conference on Cluster Munitions, Africa’s participation in the 
Oslo Process2 began in earnest. There were 14 states present, and consis-
tent with the continent’s overall stance on general and complete disar-
mament, these states spoke out against the dreadful weapons. 
Thereafter, more African countries began to participate in the cause. 
Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zambia 
became actively engaged in the Oslo Process. At the Livingstone African 
Conference on Cluster Munitions, held from 31 March to 1 April 2008, 
in Livingstone, Zambia, the countries of Libya, Namibia and Tunisia, 
never before part of the process, were in attendance. Thirty-nine African 
countries declared that the continent neither wanted the “continued uncon-
trolled proliferation of destructive weapons” on the continent nor to be the 
“dumping ground for weapons obsolete in other parts of the world.”3 
Africa’s Expectations for the CCM Negotiations
For Africa, the Convention on Cluster Munitions would address the 
negative humanitarian effects of these weapons. Since the continent 
is already plagued by crises—including inadequate health care and a 
lack of financial, technological and human-resource capacities—it was 
imperative that strong language be included, particularly on definitions, 
victim assistance and international cooperation and assistance (i.e., 
Articles 2, 5 and 6 respectively of the Convention on Cluster Munitions). 
Africa, in its deliberations during the Dublin Diplomatic Conference 
held in Ireland, felt that assistance in whatever form—technical, finan-
cial or human—was vital, especially for poor countries that lack these 
capacities. In addition, African representatives wanted to avoid the 
inclusion of a clause permitting a transition period or any tolerance of 
interoperability language (i.e., joint military operations with countries 
not adhering to the ban).
After a position was determined, the 38 participating African coun-
tries present spoke as one through Zambia. Four African states (Egypt, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia and Libya) also participated as observers, attending 
meetings and expressing their own views. Strategy meetings were held 
every day during lunch breaks and served as an opportunity for informa-
tion exchange and feedback. Zambia, as the coordinator, had assigned 
different countries to take the lead for the African Group in different 
parallel informal sessions and report back to the full group meetings. 
For instance, Malawi was the lead for Article 21 (interoperability), Sierra 
Leone for Article 5 (victim assistance), Ghana for Article 2 (definitions) 
An African Perspective on the Cluster 
Munitions Convention 
by sheila Mweemba [ Zambia Mine Action Centre ]
On 30 May 2008, the international community adopted the Convention on Cluster Munitions.1 It is little won-
der that those who were against a convention of this sort are still reeling from the shock of it. Africa, on the 
other hand, can give itself a well-deserved pat on the back for having played a pivotal role in the adoption of 
a groundbreaking, legally-binding instrument of which posterity will judge the results.
and Uganda for Article 4 (clearance) discussions. This system allowed 
Africa to be well represented and have its views effectively expressed.
Definitions. At the Livingstone Conference, Africa discussed con-
tentious issues at length and agreed on common positions. On the issue 
of definitions, the African consensus was that the draft convention to 
be negotiated in Dublin should provide a categorical prohibition for the 
stockpiling, production and transfer of cluster munitions as a whole cat-
egory, with no distinction over what type may be considered good or 
bad. This approach was deemed critical to making an effective conven-
tion for the protection of civilians. It was argued that this strategy would 
make cluster munitions a stigmatized weapon. Africa also preferred that 
Article 2(c) be deleted from the draft, as its presence provided for an 
opportunity for exceptions to be included. 
In Livingstone, Africa (apart from South Africa, which highlighted 
the military utility of the weapons in terms of their accuracy in point-
targeting) opted for a total ban on cluster munitions. In the African 
view, no cluster munition causes acceptable harm to civilians. In 
Dublin, however, a compromise was reached to limit exceptions—essen-
tially banning about 98 percent of cluster munitions currently in use. It 
was critical to Africa’s position that this compromise was not used to 
exclude cluster munitions that had the same intolerable effects as cluster 
Cluster Munition Coalition campaign workshop held prior to the official Kampala Confer-
ence. North African CMC campaigners Ayman sorour of protection (egypt), left, and Rachid 
Dahmani of Handicap International–Algeria.
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Injury, Fire, Lack of Funding Complicate Demining in Lebanon 
While most of the immediate landmine danger has been removed from southern Lebanon along its border with Israel, multiple 
factors have complicated the demining process throughout the country. In southern Lebanon, 43 percent of the contaminated 
land has been fully cleared, while another 49 percent was surface-cleared, according to the Mine Action Coordination Centre, 
South Lebanon. UNMACC–SL has been a leading force in clearing mines in this area; however, because of a lack of funding, 
many of its clearance teams stopped work at the end of August 2008. As a result, the injury rate is expected to escalate be-
cause, as in the past, locals will likely attempt to remove contaminants themselves when they face a lack of assistance.
In late July 2008, a Lebanese citizen, Abbas Akout, working with the Mines Advisory Group, was injured by a cluster bomb that 
detonated near him while he was attempting to disarm landmines in Zwatar, a village in southern Lebanon. The cluster bomb 
was identified as one of the bombs dropped by Israel in southern Lebanon during 2006. Akout sustained moderate damage to 
his hands and feet. More than 50 Lebanese and international workers, as well as over 250 civilians, have already been injured 
by these cluster bombs.      
Also in July, emergency crews fighting a forest fire in the Bmikin region of Lebanon faced a unique challenge: extinguishing a 
fire in an area where cluster munitions from the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict of 2006, as well as landmines from the Lebanese Civil 
War, were still polluting the land. The resulting explosions and decreased safety of the area caused several hectares of forest 
(one hectare equals approximately 2.5 acres) to be destroyed before the fire was eventually extinguished.
United Nations
The U.N. has indicated that the demining operations in Lebanon may need to be eliminated without extra funding. The U.S. 
Department of State has given an initial sum of US$825,000 and is working with the American Task Force in Lebanon in the search for 
additional funding to keep the program afloat.
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